The general election on 7 June was an important step on the way to electing a new president and the formation of a new government in Indonesia. Indonesians voted enthusiastically. The poll was generally peaceful and largely free and fair. The scale of the breaches which occurred on polling day were not significant enough to undermine the overall integrity of the vote itself.
The final step in the election of a president is still several months off. It takes place in the 700 member People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The 462 members of the Parliament (DPR) elected in the 7 June general election are automatically members of the MPR. In addition, the MPR comprises five regional delegates from each of the twenty-seven provinces, a total of 135. They are selected by the 27 provincial assemblies, which were also elected in a separate ballot on 7 June. The MPR also includes 65 representatives of a diverse range of organisations and interest groups. Finally, the MPR includes the 38 representatives of the Indonesian Armed Forces who sit in the DPR.
The 1999 Election Result
As of 30 June, the official count is far from complete. The resulting delay has caused concern in a country where the previous Government consistently manipulated the poll results at all levels of the election process, but especially during the reporting of election results from the booths to the national tally. This underlines the importance of waiting for the final official declaration of the results before coming to a view about the fairness of the election overall.
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the final official count, the following table is a reasonable projection of the likely outcome in the DPR:
Likely Composition of the DPR
Pro Megawati Soekarnoputri
|
Uncommitted
|
Pro Habibie
|
| PDI Perjuangan (PDIP) |
155 |
PAN |
37 |
Golkar |
120 |
| PKB |
56 |
Armed Forces |
38 |
PPP |
120 |
| Small Nationalist parties |
11 |
|
|
Small Muslim parties |
29 |
| TOTAL |
222 |
TOTAL |
75 |
TOTAL |
203 |
While Megawati could win almost 40% of the national vote, her PDIP party will have only 31% of the seats in the DPR. The PDIP won seats in all provinces but did particularly well in Java, where a quota for a DPR seat is in excess of 300,000. Golkar did best in Eastern Indonesia where the quotas are much lower.
The Next Steps
After finalising parties' numbers in the DPR and determining who sits in the DPR, the next most important step in determining the composition of the MPR is the selection of the 135 regional representatives. They will be elected by the 27 provincial assemblies (DPRD I) which were elected in separate voting on the same day as the DPR. They are expected to convene in mid August, and one of their first tasks is to decide how they will select their five delegates each. Each assembly may decide on different procedures.
Thus there are many uncertainties, but some possibilities suggest themselves. In a process of bargaining and consensus making, the DPRD I are more likely to agree on a group of 5 delegates who reflect the main forces in each DPRD I. They may, of course, choose to select local figures not openly linked to the parties. DPRD I also have Armed Forces members and some DPRD I may include an Armed Forces representative among their delegates.
If delegates are chosen on the basis of consensus among the parties in the assemblies, the composition of the 135 regional representatives should be reasonably diverse and consistent with the overall result in the DPR. There should be a bias towards Golkar because it has done best outside Java/Bali, where there are 21 provinces as against six in Java/Bali. PDIP, however, should still be well represented because it has a reasonable presence in most regional parliaments.
Selecting the Group Delegates
The KPU determined the composition of the 65 group representatives on 22 April. It includes 20 religious leaders; 5 veterans; 9 business people; 5 women's representatives; 9 intellectuals/artists; 5 youth/students and NGOs; 5 civil service representatives; 5 representatives of ethnic minorities; and 2 disabled. Despite the many uncertainties, it is unlikely that these 65 delegates will be overwhelmingly supportive of the present president.
The following table assumes that
- Gus Dur's PKB will support Megawati.
- PAN will split, with the majority supporting an Islamic /Habibie coalition
- Golkar will not split
- the regional delegates will be selected largely in proportion to their numbers in the provincial assemblies, although Golkar may seek to elect all Golkar delegates from provinces it dominates
- another 15 Armed Forces delegates will be among those selected by the regional assemblies
- the 65 group delegates will split almost equally between Megawati and Habibie:
Likely Balance of Power in the MPR
Pro Megawati Soekarnoputri
|
Uncommitted
|
Pro Habibie
|
| PDI Perjuangan (PDIP) |
198 |
Armed Forces |
53 |
Golkar |
172 |
| PKB |
62 |
|
|
PPP |
65 |
| Group Delegates |
31 |
|
|
Group Delegates |
34 |
| Small Nationalis parties |
11 |
|
|
Small Muslim parties |
29 |
| PAN |
15 |
|
|
PAN |
30 |
| TOTAL |
311 |
TOTAL |
53 |
TOTAL |
336 |
The table suggests that Megawati does not have a clear hold on the presidency. On these figures, she needs the Armed Forces to be elected president. Even then it would be a narrow victory. The above table, moreover, makes no allowances for manipulation of the official results of the general election, 'dirty politics' in the selection of the regional and group delegates, or the 'buying' of delegates. Megawati's position could worsen to the point where the Habibie coalition has a simply majority (50% plus 1) in the MPR and the Armed Forces vote is no longer decisive..
The Armed Forces
In the election, the Armed Forces appear to have been largely neutral, as the Armed Forces Commander and Minister for Defence and Security, General Wiranto, promised. In the vote for the presidency, there is nothing at this stage to indicate whether the Armed Forces will favour Megawati or Habibie. Habibie has publicly offered the Vice-Presidency to Wiranto. But Megawati and her PKB partner, Gus Dur, are both well disposed towards the Armed Forces and Wiranto. Automatic Armed Forces support for the current president should not be assumed.
The Vote for President
The election of the president is currently set for 10 November. The delays that have occurred in the reporting of the count may mean that the November date may slip. While the general election has been relatively peaceful, this final step in the election of the president may be marked by tension and possible violence. As the time for the vote approaches, the lobbying and pressuring of the MPR delegates will be intense.
Muslim opponents of Megawati may well openly demonstrate against her and her candidacy for the presidency. They will use the argument that she is not a genuine Muslim because she has been photographed praying in a Hindu temple in Bali (she is a quarter Balinese). They will again argue that, consistent with Muslim dogma, a woman cannot be president of a Muslim country. They will also point to the non-Muslims among the PDIP's MPR delegates (ignoring the non-Muslims among the Golkar and Armed Forces delegates). They will argue that among her supporters are dangerous radicals, the children and grandchildren of members of the pre-Soeharto Indonesian Communist Party. There will be attempts to split Gus Dur's PKB party from its de facto coalition with Megawati.
Although she is likely to dissuade them from doing so, Megawati's supporters may want to go out onto the streets to demonstrate the strength of her claims to the presidency. In addition to this party political activity on the streets, radical students can also be expected to demonstrate in favour of their demands for an end to the Armed Forces 'dual function' and that Soeharto be put on trial.
In the tense situation which could develop, there is scope for surprises. Megawati could offer the vice-presidency to the Armed Forces or to a respected Muslim figure like Nurcholish Madjid. A 'compromise' candidate for president such as the Sultan of Yogyakarta could suddenly emerge.
At this stage of a long, uncertain and potentially unstable process, President Habibie is confident of accumulating the numbers required to win the presidency, but Megawati is still very much in the race. The choice of president and vice-president could ultimately rest with the Armed Forces. In these circumstances, they will find it hard to ignore the consequences for national unity and stability of disappointing the 40% of voters nationally who voted for Megawati. The next few weeks will determine whether there will be a coalition of the "reformist" political parties. This will greatly enhanced Megawati's changes to form the next government.
Economic Policies of the New Government
As is often the case, the policies that are adopted by the new government in place may differ from the ones that it has stated before. Nonetheless, it is useful to survey the main economic ideas that have been espoused by leaders of the three "reformist" political parties that could ultimately end up forming the new government.
The party platforms of PDIP, PKB and PAN on the directions of economic policies are rather general. Perhaps rather surprisingly, they are oriented towards "mainstream" economics in the sense that they all support a market-based economy. PKB has come out strongest in support of a market-based economy, emphasizing property rights and the principles of non-discrimination. However, all parties see the need for strengthening markets and introducing "corrective measures". Emphasis has been given to the need to totally overhaul the judiciary system as a pre-requisite for improving (and reforming) the overall economic environment. Also, they put priority on introducing legislation that promotes fair competition.
An important economic agenda is to assist the 'little people' in a "responsible way", i.e. a fiscally responsible and economically sensible way (Reuters, 31 May 1999). There are clear elements of social justice that run through the economic platforms of all these parties. PAN emphasizes the need to develop the human resources of the 'little people'. It has argued that if the principle of justice is adhered to in managing the country and the economy, there will be no need to introduce such artificial concepts as ekonomi kerakyatan (Kompas, 26 May 1999). The existence and role of big business (conglomerates) in the economy is recognized but they should not be given special treatment, as was received by Soeharto's cronies (Kompas, 24 May 1999).
The role of foreign investment is also acknowledged. There is a sense that foreign investment is necessary in the process of economic recovery (Warta Ekonomi, 10 May 1999; The Jakarta Post, 24 May 1999). Yet, these parties express some concern that foreign investors may end up buying out major economic enterprises and controlling major economic activities (Kompas, 10 May 1999). Support has been expressed for the need to prevent this from happening by limiting the role of foreign investment in strategic sectors (including mining, forestry, and public utilities), infant industries, or key sectors such as food. The new government must be clear and more specific on this, or else it could create great uncertainties for foreign investors. In particular, the new government will have to address investor uncertainty about the impact of the new laws on the decentralization of government and regional finances, especially in the mining sector. The essence of the stance of these parties is that they welcome foreign investment, but the economy (country) should not become too dependent on foreign capital. In this regard, PAN emphasizes the importance of a better mobilization of domestic resources (The Jakarta Post, 24 May 1999).
Perhaps most significantly for boosting the confidence of the market, both foreign and domestic, has been the open acknowledgement by the three parties that they will continue to work with the IMF. PDIP leaders have revealed that thus far they have always been consulted by the IMF in formulating programs under the various letters of intent (LOI). However, they have also revealed their main criticism of the IMF. First, they critize the continued adoption of tight money policy that has resulted in high interest rates and brought about "social damage". Second, they also critize the inappropriate timing of the privatization program.
Most controversial have been the suggestions made about the adoption of a fixed exchange rate (PDI-P) and the introduction of some capital controls (PAN). Yet, both have withdrawn these proposals, noting that the IMF will not support them. There appears to be a sense of pragmatism here. However, it needs to be noted that they remain uncomfortable with an exchange and capital account regime that are too exposed to the volatility of short-term capital movements. This is an anxiety that is shared by many other countries in the world and is an issue for international discussion.
All in all, the views of the three parties that are likely to form a government essentially are not ideologically driven. They are pragmatic and "mainstream". However, they see the need for some corrective measures (or mechanisms) to produce more equitable distribution of the fruits of development. This is an economic agenda that is legitimate. The big question is how they will implement these policies and measures. There definitely will be a "learning" period. So far, these parties have relied upon those that have an understanding of the economy (e.g. Laksama Sukardi and Kwik Kian Gie in PDIP; Faisal Basri, Abdillah Toha and Dr.Arif Arryman in PAN; Dr. Yusuf Feisal in PKB). They will continue to do so. In addition, they will definitely draw on the economic technocrats, both for advice and as members of the cabinet.
30 June 1999
*The author is grateful for the comments of geoff Forrester on this note.
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